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Abstract 
 
Based on theoretical analysis of effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the wage gap 
between foreign firms and domestic firms in the host country, we use data from Chinese 
Industrial Enterprises Database to measure these effects. Theoretical results show that the 
wage gap between foreign firms and domestic firms in the host country caused by the FDI 
labor transfer effect and technology spillover effect tends to increase then decrease, which 
implies an inverted U curve track. The empirical results show that the FDI has significant 
effects on the wage gap in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the observed time 
period. The contribution of the FDI to change of the wage gap is above 10%, which is in the 
second position among all observed factors. From the overall point of view, the contribution 
of the FDI tends to decrease. The reason is that the wage gap caused by the FDI has 
stepped into the decreasing stage. This means the wage gap between foreign firms and 
domestic firms currently has been on the latter part of the inverted U curve. The Chinese 
government should expand fields for FDI so as to decrease the wage gap between foreign 
firms and domestic firms. This policy implication should be helpful for the PRC to step over 
the “middle-income trap”. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The wage gap caused by the FDI between foreign firms and domestic firms in the host 
country has been a hot topic for labor economic research and development economic 
research. A lot of theories have explained this (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Markusen 
and Venables, 1997). Some of them show that foreign firms attract many high-skilled 
workers because of their high technological level, advanced management system, and 
high wage level. This widens the wage gap between foreign firms and domestic firms in 
the host country (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Figini and Görg, 1999). Some other 
research shows that the technology spillover effect of foreign firms can improve the 
technological level for domestic firms, which narrows the wage gap (Xu, Qi, and Li, 
2009). We think foreign firms in the host country would have dynamic effects on the 
wage gap, following expansion of the FDI scale and FDI market. The effect of foreign 
firms could be different in different stages. Regretfully, there is no theoretical 
framework up to now under which we can analyze the affecting mechanism of FDI on 
the wage gap between foreign firms and domestic firms in the host country. This fact 
leads to divergence of explaining the effect of FDI on the wage gap in the host country. 
Moreover, many empirical studies have estimated the effect of FDI on the wage gap, 
but less research work focuses on the contribution of FDI to the wage gap and the 
development tendency of the effect of FDI.  
 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has attracted a large number of foreign direct 
investments since the early 1980s. Foreign firms usually pay higher wages than the 
domestic firms in order to attract the highly qualified labor force. According to Chinese 
official statistics, the average wage of foreign firms was 14.45% higher than that  
of domestic firms from 1998 to 2013. Using Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises 
Database, we find that foreign firms paid about 5.76% higher wages than domestic 
firms after controlling for enterprise scale, productivity, profits, per capital investment, 
industry, and location. Therefore, we wonder what the effect of entry of such a large 
number of FDI is. What is the tendency of this effect in the future? Through this study, 
we hope to give some suggestions for improving income inequality and decreasing risk 
of falling into the “middle income trap” in the PRC.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate effects of FDI on the wage gap in the host 
country. We first make a theoretical model, attempting to describe effects of FDI on the 
wage gap between domestic firms and foreign firms. Then we use the Shapley value 
decomposition method to compute contributions of the observed factors, including FDI 
to Gini coefficient and Theil index. Theoretical results show that the overall effect of 
foreign investment leads first to expansion of the wage gap and then to narrowing of it. 
This implies that contribution of FDI to the wage gap in the host country follows an 
inverted U-shaped track. Empirical results show that contributions of FDI on wage 
inequality of enterprises tend to fall obviously during the observed period. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we demonstrate research background for 
wage effects of FDI in the host country. In Section 3, we construct a two-sector model 
to calculate effects of FDI on the wage gap between domestic firms and foreign firms. 
In Section 4, we describe data and the estimation method. We then discuss our main 
findings in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a large amount of research on impact of FDI on the economy in the host 
country, both theoretically and empirically. Regarding the affecting mechanism of FDI 
on the wage gap, most work reveals that FDI affects the wage level and wage gap in 
the host country through two ways: labor transfer effect and technology spillover effect. 
On one hand, foreign firms entering the host country increase demand of labor. The 
labor force prefers to transfer from lower-wage domestic firms to higher-wage foreign 
firms. This inevitably leads to wage increase in the host country. However, using the 
competition model of the labor market for analysis, the wage gap would not be 
sustained forever (Brown et al., 2003; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004; Driffield and Taylor, 
2006). On the other hand, domestic firms can benefit from the presence of foreign 
multinationals through positive spillovers. This allows them to improve their productivity 
through technology transfer, labor mobility, and products mobility. The extent of 
horizontal spillover depends on R&D activities of foreign firms and absorption capacity 
of domestic firms (Todo and Miyamoto, 2006). The extent of vertical spillover depends 
on participation of domestic firms in the supply chain of foreign firms (Saggi, 2002). But 
there are contrary opinions suggesting that when the economic development level and 
technological level in the host country are low, the negative crowding-out effect of FDI 
on domestic firms may be greater than the positive spillover effect. This even hurts the 
technological development of domestic firms (Wang, 2009).  
Studies of the impact of FDI on the wage gap can be classified as two types. The first 
type is that inflow of FDI enlarges the wage gap between domestic firms and foreign 
firms. Foreign firms have the higher technological level and managerial level. This 
increases relative demand for skilled workers. In order to prevent loss of highly skilled 
workers, foreign firms often pay the higher wage. Therefore, foreign investment 
enlarges the wage gap between low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers (Lipsey 
and Sjoholm, 2004; Lipse, 2004). There is a lot of empirical evidence supporting this 
point. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) argue that multinationals from the developed 
countries always outsource production to developing countries, such as Mexico. This 
leads to an increase of relative demand for skilled workers and relative wage of skilled 
workers in developing country increases as well. Chen et al. (2011) investigates the 
wage premium and wage spillover effect of foreign firms in the PRC’s manufacture 
sector. The results indicate that expansion of foreign investment increases inter-firm 
wage inequality. 
The second type is that the direction of FDI influence on the wage gap is uncertain. Wu 
(2001) argues that this impact depends on whether the technology transfer effect 
caused by FDI is skill oriented or labor oriented, and this is irrelevant to which sector 
receives FDI. Analysis shows that FDI with relatively labor-oriented technology will 
decrease the wage gap, while relatively skill-oriented technology will increase the profit 
margin of exports and then the wage gap in the host country. Das (2002) finds that 
there are short-run effects of FDI entering skilled-labor intensive sectors. Faced with 
the wage gap between foreign firms and domestic firms, domestic firms would be 
encouraged to sustain increased demand for skilled labor. This raises the relative wage 
of domestic firms. In the long run, more FDI activities would increase the supply of 
skilled labor and would reduce relative wage. Dritfield and Taylor (2006) use industrial- 
and regional-level panel data for the UK to conclude that foreign firms have significant 
wage spillover effects on domestic firms. Such wage spillover effects are more 
widespread for skilled workers than for unskilled workers, and it is lower in sectors with 
high unemployment. 
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 Using the PRC as an example, there are numerous studies about effects of FDI on 
wage disparities across different industries and regions. Bao and Shao (2008) argue 
that wage spillover effects of FDI are closely related to industrial characteristics. They 
set up the simultaneous equations model and use the PRC’s manufactured industrial 
data and find that FDI enlarges the wage gap within the industry through the wage 
spillover effect. However, researchers obtain different conclusions about the impact of 
foreign investment on the wage gap between industries. This is because of different 
industrial characteristics.  
The industry that can absorb more foreign investment has a higher wage level. So 
foreign investment enlarges the wage gap between industries (Chen and Xie, 2004). 
Some researchers (Xu, Xuan and Zhao, 2005) also found that the region where foreign 
investments gather has the ability to offer higher wages. Imbalanced distribution of 
foreign investments across different regions is the main reason for the wage gap 
between regions. 
 To sum up, research on effects of FDI on the wage gap between domestic firms and 
foreign firms in the host country does not have a dominant conclusion. Empirical results 
even go against the theoretical conclusion. There is no study yet setting up a 
theoretical framework to analyze the affecting mechanism of FDI on the wage gap in 
the host country. Actually, the affecting mechanism of FDI on the wage gap is a 
relatively complicated process, which includes both labor transfer effect and technology 
spillover effects. The direction and extent of effect could be different in different stages. 
This paper attempts to improve existing research, both theoretically and empirically, in 
order to obtain more-convincing results.  
3. MODEL 
We incorporate two affecting mechanisms of FDI on the wage gap into a theoretical 
model. Specifically, by analyzing the change of Theil index caused by labor transfer 
effect and technology spillover effect, we construct a two-sector model to calculate the 
effect of FDI on wage inequality between domestic firms and foreign firms. First, 
workers employed in domestic firms will surely be attracted to higher wages paid by 
foreign firms. Then, we calculate the change of Theil index caused by the labor transfer 
effect. Second, the relative wage between foreign firms and domestic firms can be 
derived from the technology spillover model. We then introduce this relative wage into 
the Theil index. The variation of inequality along with the increase of FDI technology 
spillover can be calculated. Finally, based on an overall analysis of two affecting 
mechanisms, we give the final theoretical results. 
The model follows Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and is developed based on the two-sector 
model used by Robinson (1976), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), and Zhou (2009).  
Assumption 1: There are two sectors, dY  (domestic sector) and fY  (foreign sector),  
that use capital ( K ) and labor ( L ); Y  is the total output of society with the expression 
as follows: 
( )
1
.d fY Y Y
ρ ρ ργ= +  
where the elasticity of substitution between dY  and fY  is 1/ (1 )ρ− ; γ  is the importance 
of fY  to Y . 
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Assumption 2: The production functions of two sectors are given as follows: 
f f f fY A K L
α β=  
d d d dY A K L
α β=  
where fA  and dA  denote technology parameter. The labor market is competitive and 
clear, and people can move across the sector. d fL L L+ = , labor’s shares of domestic 
sector and foreign sector, are 1-η  and η , respectively.  
Assumption 3: dW  and fW  represent wages of domestic sector and foreign sector, 
respectively. The average wage of the whole country can be expressed as 
(1- ) d fW Wη η+ . The wage of two sectors depends on the technical level and also is an 
increasing function of it. The expression is as follows: 
( ),  0ff f
f
w
w f A
A
∂
= >
∂
 
( ),  0dd d
d
ww f A
A
∂
= >
∂
,  
The level of technology in the foreign sector is higher than the domestic sector, so
f dw w> , 1
f
d
w
w
w
= > . 
Assumption 4: There is no wage gap within each sector. 
3.1 Effect of Labor Transfer on Wage Inequality 
In this section, we ignore the effect of technology spillover and only analyze the effect 
of labor transfer on the wage gap. Assumption 5 is given as follows: 
Assumption 5: There is no technology spillover existing between two sectors; thus, the 
wage gap, depending on technical level, is a constant. 
Theil index is selected as the analyzing tool, due to the reason that it is more sensitive 
to income difference between groups.1 The formula of Theil index is as follows: 
i
i
i
I
I IT Ln NI
N
 
 =   
 
∑   (1) 
where iI  denotes total income of group i , iN  denotes number of individuals of group 
,i  and I  and N are gross income and total number of individuals, respectively. The 
expression of Theil index between domestic sector and foreign sector can be 
calculated as follows: 
1  Theil index is sensitive to transfers of income from poor to rich. 
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+
((1 ) ) ((1 ) )
ln ln
((1 ) ) 1 ((1 ) )
(1- ) ln ln
   = ln((1 ) )
(1 )
f fd d
d f f f d fd d
d f d f
d d f f
d f
d f
L wL w
L w w L w L w wL wT
L w w L w w
w w w w
w w
w w
η η η η
η η η η η η
η η
η η
η η
− + − +
= +
− + − − +
− − +
− +
 (2) 
In order to find out the effect of labor transfer on wage inequality, the first derivative of 
equation (2) on η  is as follows: 
( )+
2
2
2
( ln - ln )((1 ) ) ( ) (1- ) ln ln ((1 ) )
=
((1 ) )
- ( ) (ln ln )+ ( )
      =
((1 ) )
f f f d d f d f d d f f d f
d f
d f d f f d d d f
d f
w w w w w w w w w w w w w wT
w w
w w w w w w w w w
w w
η η η η η η
η η η
η
η η
− + − − − − +∂
∂ − +
− + − −
− +
  (3) 
η∗  is obtained to make the value of equation (3) zero. 
2
2
(ln ln )+ ( )
=
( )
ln +1
   =
1
d f f d d d f
d f
f f f
d d d
f
d
w w w w w w w
w w
w w w
w w w
w
w
η∗
− −
−
−
 
− 
 
  (4) 
Hence, if η η∗= , then 0T
η
∂
=
∂
 
Since 1f
d
w
w
> , it is easy to find out 0,1)* (η ∈ 2.  
Workers who are employed in domestic firms will surely be attracted by higher wages 
paid in foreign firms. So labor will transfer from the domestic sector to the foreign 
sector. This means η  will increase. According to derivation result, if 0 η η∗< < , then 
0T
η
∂
>
∂
, which means the wage gap between two sectors will increase gradually, along 
with labor transfer, before η  arrives at the critical point η ∗ . While 1η η∗ < < , then
0T
η
∂
<
∂
. This means labor transfer from domestic sector to foreign sector will narrow the 
gap after η  exceeds the critical point η ∗ . In summary, the wage gap between two 
2  let ln +1f f f f
d d d d
w w w w
f
w w w w
 
= − 
 
, ln 0
f
d
f
w
dw
w
f
w
′ = > , (1) 0f = , so 0f
d
w
f
w
 
> 
 
; let 1 +lnf f f
d d d
w w w
g
w w w
 
= − 
 
, 
1 0
f
d
d
w
fw
wg
w
′ = − < , (1) 0g = , so 0f
d
w
g
w
 
< 
 
, 1 +ln 0f f f
d d d
w w w
w w w
 
− < 
 
, that is 1η∗ < . 
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sectors increases first and then decreases with labor transfer, which is an inverted  
U-shaped variation.  
To find out the specific feature and shape of the U-shaped curve, the second derivative 
of equation (2) on η  is given as follows: 
2
2
32
3
1 1 1 2 1 2 ln 1
1
1 2 2 2ln 1
     
1
f f f f f f f
d d d d d d d
f
d
f f f
d d d
f
d
w w w w w w w
w w w w w w wT
w
w
w w w
w w w
w
w
η η η
η
η η
η
η η
         
 − − − + + − − − +                 ∂  =
∂  
− + 
 
    
− − − −         =
 
− + 
 
 (5) 
η∗∗  is obtained to make the value of equation (5) zero:  
**
2ln 1
2 1
f
d
f
d
w
w
w
w
η
+
=
 
− 
 
  (6) 
Since,  
** *
2
2ln 1 ln 1
0
2 1 1
f f f f
d d d d
f f
d d
w w w w
w w w w
w w
w w
η η
+ − +
− = − >
   − −   
   
3  (7) 
Namely, * **η η<  
Figure 1 depicts a process occurring when the wage gap moves along with labor 
transfer from the domestic sector to the foreign sector. At the beginning, the wage gap 
between two sectors gradually expands following the increase of the labor’s share of 
the foreign sector (Stage 1). More and more labor moving into the foreign sector 
reduces the wage gap (Stage 2). Once η  exceeds η∗∗ , the wage gap decrease starts 
to slow down (Stage 3). According to equation (4) and equation (6), the values of .η∗  
and η  depend on f
d
w
w
. 
  
3  let 3 2ln 3f f f
d d d
w w w
h
w w w
 
= − − 
 
, (1) 0h = , 3 2 0
f
d
f d
w
d fw
w wh
w w
 
′ = − > 
 
 so 0f
d
w
h
w
 
> 
 
, that is ** * 0.η η− >  
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Figure 1: Effect of Labor Transfer on the Wage Gap 
 
3.2 Effect of Technology Spillover on Wage Inequality 
All descriptions in the above section about the effect of labor transfer from the domestic 
sector to the foreign-invested sector on the wage gap are under the condition that no 
technology spillover exists. In order to figure out the effect of technology spillover on 
wage inequality, there is a need to relax Assumptions 5 and 6. 
 Assumption 6: Foreign sector could affect the productivity of domestic sector by 
technology spillover. The level of technology in the domestic sector will increase 
with higher foreign-invested capital, due to possible technology spillovers (Saglam 
and Sayek, 2011), d fA AK
δ= , where fK  denotes foreign-invested capital. A  denotes 
the net of the foreign-invested sector’s technology spillovers on domestic sector’s 
productivity; σ  denotes the extent of technology spillovers from fK , and σ  is an 
increase function of fK , 0
fK
δ∂
>
∂
. Normalize the price of the final good Y  to 1. 
 According to Assumption 1, competitive pricing gives a standard relative demand 
equation for domestic sector and foreign sector: 
1
f d
d f
P Y
P Y
ρ
γ
−
 
=   
 
 
where dP  and fP  denote the prices of the two sectors. The wage premium between 
domestic sector and foreign is w : 
1( )
f f f f
d d d
W K A L
w
W K A L
βρρρ α δ
αργ
−−   
= =   
   
  (8) 
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Equation (2) can be converted as follows: 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1
2
ln ln 1 (1 ) ln 1
1
W W W W
W W W W
T W
W
η η η η η η
η η
    
− − + − − − +    
    =
− +
  (9) 
To simplify the process of the deduction, let 
1
1 f f f
d d
K A L
J
K A L
αρ βρρ
γ
−    
=           
, f f
d
W
JK
W
ρδ−=  
substitute f
d
W
W
 in equation (9),  
- -ln ln(1 ) (1 ) ln(1 )
1
f f f f
f
JK JK JK JK
T
JK
ρδ ρδ ρδ ρδ
ρδ
η η η η η η
η η
− −
−
 − − + − − − + =
− +
  (10) 
In order to figure out the technology spillover effect of foreign sector on wage 
inequality, the first derivative of equation (10) on δ  is given as follows: 
2
(1 ) ln ln
(1 )
f f f
f
JK K JKT
JK
ρδ ρδ
ρδ
η ρη
δ η η
− −
−
− −∂
=
∂ − +
  (11) 
Since 0T
δ
∂
<
∂
, improvements in the extent of technology spillovers will reduce the wage 
gap between two sectors, which accords with conventional wisdom. 
Similarly, to find out the specific feature and shape of the curve, the second derivative 
of equation (10) on δ  is given as follows: 
2 2 -2
2 3
2 2
3
(1 ) (ln ) (1 )(ln 1) ln
(1 )
(1 ) (ln ) (1 ) ln 1 ln
        
1
f f f f f f
f
f f f f f
f
d d d d d
f
d
JK K JK JK JK JKT
JK
W W W W W
K
W W W W W
W
W
ρδ ρδ ρδ ρδ ρδ
ρδ
η ρ η η η η
δ η η
η ρ η η η η
η η
− − − −
−
 − − + − +∂  =
∂ − +
  
− − + − +  
  =
 
− + 
 
  (12) 
The sign of equation (12) depends on the function as follows: 
(1 ) ln 1 lnf f f f f
d d d d d
W W W W W
L
W W W W W
η η η
   
= − + − +   
   
 
The image of f
d
W
L
W
 
 
 
 is shown as Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Image of f
d
W
L
W
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, If 0
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A
W
= 4, 0f
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W
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J A
K
δ δ
ρ
= = , then 
2
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T
δ
∂
=
∂
. If 01
f
d
W
A
W
< < , then
0f
d
W
L
W
 
> 
 
, that is *δ δ< , 
2
2 0
T
δ
∂
>
∂
. If 0
f
d
W
A
W
> , then 0f
d
W
L
W
 
< 
 
, that is *δ δ> ,
2
2 0.
T
δ
∂
<
∂
 
These analyses lead to the conclusion that technology spillovers can reduce the wage 
gap between two sectors with increasing speed under the condition of *δ δ> ; once δ
exceeds *δ , the reducing speed will start to slow down. Figure 3 depicts this process. 
Figure 3: Effect of Technology Spillover on the Wage Gap 
 
3.3 Comprehensive Influence of Labor Transfer  
and Technology Spillover 
Generally, higher wages and higher welfare paid by foreign firms will surely attract the 
local qualified labor force to transfer from other sectors, if obstacles of labor mobility do 
not exist. Therefore, the effect of labor transfer will play a role in the wage gap. 
Correspondingly, due to restriction of technical barriers, patent system, as well as the 
4  0A depends on .η  
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absorptive capacity of local enterprises, the technology spillover effect lags behind the 
labor transfer effect. But lag length is influenced by many factors. There are two 
distribution situations existing in the time dimension. 
First, the effect of technology spillover happens before the wage gap caused by labor 
transfer reaches the inflection point. This process is depicted in Figure 4. This means 
that technology spillover effect has already started to play a role in reducing the wage 
gap when it is in the expansion phase that the labor-transfer effect works. This situation 
might lead to two consequences. The first is that expansion phase of wage gap caused 
by labor transfer is shortened; the second is reduction of maximum value of the wage 
gap caused by labor transfer, and reduction appears earlier. The overall result is that 
technology spillover effect leads to an overall reduction of the inverted U-shaped curve 
compared to the curve caused by the labor transfer effect. 
Figure 4: Shorter Lag between Two Effects 
 
Second, the technology spillover effect occurs after the wage gap caused by the labor 
transfer effect reaches the inflection point. This process is depicted in Figure 5. In this 
figure, the effect of technology spillover does not affect the first half and vertices of the 
inverted U curve. But it speeds up the declining rate of the latter part of the curve, 
which is caused by labor transfer.  
Figure 5: Longer Lag between Two Effects 
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In general, theoretical analysis shows that the wage gap between two sectors 
increases first and then decreases as labor transfers from domestic sector to foreign 
sectors. This implies an inverted U-shaped track. Meanwhile, increased technological 
spillovers reduce the wage gap between the two sectors. Finally, the overall effect of 
foreign investment leads the wage gap between two sectors first to increase and then 
to decrease. This means the overall effect of foreign investment on the wage gap also 
implies an inverted U-shaped track. 
Using the Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises Database, the rest of this paper uses a 
regression-based inequality decomposition approach to explore determinants of the 
wage gap in the PRC. A comparison between the empirical result and theoretical 
results could be helpful to examine the robustness of our assumptions. 
4. EMPIRICAL METHOD AND DATA 
Current research about inequality decomposition includes Oaxaca Decomposition 
Cotton Decomposition, Neumark Decomposition, Brown Decomposition, and Appleton 
Decomposition. Each method has its own limitations. We use a regression-based 
Shapley Decomposition Approach, which has been improved by Wan (2004), to 
calculate the contributions of explanatory variables to income inequality. The basic idea 
of this method is that in the regression function we replace each variable by its mean 
value. The new fitted value can be considered as assessed income inequality ruling out 
the effect of that variable on inequality. The difference between assessed inequality 
and actual inequality can be considered as the contribution of that variable.  
To implement the decomposition method, we first construct the decomposition function, 
as below, following the income function proposed by Shorrocks and Wan (2004):  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 
it t it t it t it t it t it t it t it
t it t it t i it
lnW FCC DR EXP CLA PCP OLP MON
SCAL NPR X
α β β β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + + +
  (13) 
Where W  is the average annual wage per worker, which encompasses the accrued 
payroll and welfare; fcc  (Foreign-capital corporations) is the core dummy variable, 
which is identified as 1 if the enterprise is foreign investment, 0 otherwise. Other control 
variables include: dr  is debt ratio, reflecting the viability of enterprises; exp  is export 
performance, measuring the degree of export dependency; clr is capital-labor ratio, 
which is used to distinguish labor intensity; pcp  is per capita profit as assessment of 
economic efficiency; olp  is overall labor productivity, reflecting the level of production 
and technology; mon  is also a dummy variable, identified as 1 if the enterprise belongs 
to a monopoly industry5; sca  is total assets, which indicates enterprise scale; pnp  is 
proportion of new products, which indicates innovation capacity. We also include 
regional dummy variables, considering different development levels of east-central-
west regions in the PRC. To compute the contribution to income inequality, we solve 
the estimated model to get the income level value. As a consequence, the constant 
term becomes a scalar so that it does not contribute to inequality. Hence, both the 
constant and dummy variable terms can be removed without affecting decomposition 
results (Wan, 2004). 
5  According to Ding (2010), Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction; Petroleum Processing and Coking; 
Coal Mining and Processing; Mining and Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores; Manufacture of 
Tobacco; Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat Power; Production and Supply of Gas; 
Production and Supply of Water are classified as the monopoly industries. 
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exp( ) exp( ) exp( ) exp( )i i iW X T uα β= × × ×   (14) 
Second, according to the regression result, we adopt the Shapley Decomposition 
Approach to calculate contributions of explanatory variables to income inequality by 
using the java program developed by the UNU-WIDER. 
The database we use consists of a panel of Chinese manufacturing enterprises from 
1999 to 2007. This dataset comes from the National Bureau of Statistics Enterprise 
Dataset. The National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC (NBSC) obtains annual reports 
from most state enterprises and large- and medium-sized non-state enterprises  
(with sales of more than five million yuan per year). These annual reports contain the 
firm’s financial statements and some non-financial information, such as the entry date, 
district code, industry code, and the main products of the enterprise. This database is 
used as the base of compiling the statistical data for the aggregate manufacturing 
sector, which is collected in the China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2000–2008). 
Statistics in this database on two-digit manufacturing industries are collected in the 
China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2000-2008). The sample size of 
160,000 in 1999 has been increased to 330,000 in 2007. We eliminate outliers 
according to methods of Cai and Liu (2009)6 and deflate price separately by CPI, PPI 
and FAIPI and finally pick up 12,892 enterprises consisting of 7,726 domestic 
enterprises and 5,116 foreign-invested enterprises from 1999 to 2007. 
There might be multi-collinearity among these variables. But none of the Pearson 
correlation coefficients was larger than 0.4. Variance inflation factors fell from the band 
of 1.03 to 1.41. This evidence could prove that there is no multiple co-linear relation 
among variables. Descriptive statistics of primary variables are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean SD Min Max 
W  116,028 17,555.26 16,282.34 81.27 1478,836 
fcc  116,028 0.41 0.4918 0 1 
dr  116,028 57.74 38.58 –46.32 4,846.23 
exp  116,028 26.86 39.56 0 104.67 
clr  116,028 313.58 695.96 0.17 147,886.4 
pcp  116,028 13.44 53.92 –5,501.61 2,678.385 
olp  116028 88.77 196.03 –8,801.03 22,506.07 
mon  116028 0.07 0.25 0 1 
sca  116028 80,251.62 147,725.9 171 2,921,800 
pnp  116028 3.68 14.48 0 100 
We use data of 12,892 companies to calculate wage ratio between foreign firms and 
domestic firms ( )f dW W ; the proportion of foreign firms’ workforce accounts for the 
total labor force ( )η  and the corresponding η∗  and η∗∗ from 1999 to 2007 (results are 
reported in Table 2). Seen from the table, η  exceeds η∗  in 2004. This means that the 
6  The following data observations have been excluded from the sample: those with missing value, those 
for the enterprises not meeting the criterion of “above designated size’ and those outliers in the key 
variables. 
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wage gap between the domestic sector and foreign sector caused by labor transfer 
effect has entered the declining phase, as we predict in our theoretical analysis. 
 
Table 2: Results of **, , ,f dW W η η η
∗  
 f dW W  η  *η  **η  
1999 1.6401 0.3564 0.4182 0.8725 
2000 1.6301 0.3752 0.4192 0.8748 
2001 1.5146 0.3936 0.4312 0.9020 
2002 1.5288 0.4140 0.4297 0.8986 
2003 1.4805 0.4307 0.4349 0.9101 
2004 1.4237 0.4580 0.4414 0.9237 
2005 1.3978 0.4658 0.4444 0.9299 
2006 1.3887 0.4733 0.4455 0.9321 
2007 1.3456 0.4596 0.4507 0.9423 
We also calculate the value of Theil index between domestic firms and foreign firms 
(according formula 9), Theil index for all the companies’ average wage, and the 
changing rate of Theil index from 1999 to 2007. The results are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Theil Index between Two Sectors and All Companies’ Average Wage  
 
Theil Index 
between Two 
Sectors  
twoT  
Rates of 
Change  
(%) 
Theil Index of All 
Companies’ 
Average Wage  
allT  
Rates of 
Change  
(%) 
two
all
T
T  
(%) 
1999 0.0300 – 0.24115 – 12.44 
2000 0.0295 –1.67 0.24052 –0.26 12.27 
2001 0.0214 –27.46 0.2344 –2.54 9.13 
2002 0.0224 4.67 0.24623 5.05 9.10 
2003 0.0192 –14.29 0.22288 –9.48 8.61 
2004 0.0156 –18.75 0.21027 –5.66 7.42 
2005 0.0140 –10.26 0.20417 –2.90 6.86 
2006 0.0134 –4.29 0.20774 1.75 6.45 
2007 0.0110 –17.91 0.20977 0.98 5.24 
Average 0.01961 –11.24 0.22413 –1.63 8.61 
1999–2007 –63.33  –7.05  
From Table 3, first, we know the whole wage gap between enterprises in the PRC 
shows a shrinking trend from 1999 to 2007. This might be because supply and  
demand of the labor market has undergone structural changes. Labor supply exceeds 
labor demand slowly. Faced with increasing competition in the labor market, some 
enterprises that used to provide the low level of wages have to increase the wage level 
in order to attract the labor force. This leads to a decrease in the wage gap. 
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Second, the whole wage gap between enterprises is quite significant in the PRC, Theil 
index of all companies’ average wage is within the range of 0.2 to 0.25. The average 
wage is about 0.22. Theil indexes between domestic firms and foreign firms are from 
0.01 to 0.03. The proportions of the latter accounting for the former are from 5% to 
12%. The average value of this proportion is more than 8%. This means that 
contribution of wage gap accounting for the Theil index is obvious. However, the 
proportion is declining, implying FDI is no longer the main reason for the wage gap 
between enterprises. 
Finally, Table 2 shows that the turning point of the wage gap caused by labor transfer 
effect takes place in 2004. Table 3 shows that the overall wage gap has been declining 
since 1999, which means the technology spillover effect took place before 2004. In 
other words, the total influence of labor transfer effect and technology spillover effect 
on the wage gap in the PRC supports the first case of our theoretical analysis. The 
effect of technology spillover happens before the wage gap caused by labor transfer 
effect reaches the turning point.  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 presents estimation results of equation (13). Column (1) shows the estimation 
results of Fixed Effect Model with the log average wage of enterprise as dependent 
variable. The presence of significant heteroscedasticity and serial correlation can be 
tested using Wooldridge test and Wald test. Therefore, we report Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (see Driscoll 
and Kraay, 1998). Column (2) of Table 4 shows the results. 
Table 4: Results of Estimating Equation (13) 
 
Estimation Results of the 
Fixed Effect Model 
Estimation Results of the Fixed 
Effect Model with Driscoll and 
Kraay Standard Errors 
fcc  0.0545*** 0.0545** 
dr  –0.0985** –0.0985 
exp  –0.5273*** –0.5273 
cla  0.0351*** 0.0351 
pcp  0.4072*** 0.4072*** 
olp  0. 2355*** 0. 2355*** 
mon  0. 1688*** 0. 1688*** 
sca  0.0282*** 0.0282** 
npr  0.0123 0.0123 
Central region –0.1491 –0.1491*** 
Western region 0.0167 0.0167 
Constant 9.1262*** 9.1262*** 
Wooldridge text 594.849 
(0.000) 
 
Wald text 5,300,000 
(0.000) 
 
R2 0.2981 0.2981 
Prob>F (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 116,028 116,028 
Note: Time dummies are all significant at the 1% level. For convenience, they are not reported.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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After standard errors have been corrected, estimated coefficients of the foreign-capital 
company, per capita profit, overall labor productivity, monopoly, and scale of enterprise 
are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The estimated coefficient of  
the foreign-capital company is significantly positive at the 5% level. This suggests that 
FDI has a significant impact on the wage level of the PRC. This also indicates that 
foreign-capital companies pay the 5.6% higher wage than domestic companies. There 
is a significant wage gap between foreign capital and domestic companies.  
Per capita profit, enterprise scale, and monopoly have significantly positive coefficients. 
This means that these variables are important factors for wage determination in the 
PRC. According to the profit-sharing model (Kahneman et al., 1986), companies with 
higher profits are more willing to provide high wages for their employees. The cost of 
the inner supervision, organization, management, and coordination is usually high in 
large-scale enterprises, a high level of wage can help companies reduce these costs 
on the basis of efficiency wage theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Monopoly industries 
with benefits from the government and monopoly prices pay a higher level of wages to 
employees. This result is recognized by many literature studies.  
The impacts of debt ratio and export on the wage level are negative in the PRC. It is 
clear that a high debt ratio means a bad financial situation. Regarding the export, the 
PRC still exports labor-intensive products, and export enterprises usually pay relatively 
lower wages in order to maintain export advantages. Both variables have insignificant 
coefficients. 
According to neoclassical theory, high capital-labor ratio means higher marginal 
products of labor. This means that only enterprises with higher returns have the ability 
to conduct research and development of new products and then pay the higher level  
of wage for workers, but both variables have insignificant coefficients, implying that 
neither of them is a crucial factor in the wage-determination process.  
In order to decompose the annual wage gap, we also need to obtain the annual income 
estimation equation from 1999 to 2007. That means running the regression on annual 
cross-sectional data. We put regression results in the Appendix tables. 
We compute contributions of each explanatory variable in the regression model using 
the Shapley value-based approach (decomposition results are shown in Table 5). 
Since the decomposition results are influenced by choice of the inequality index, 
decomposition results are presented for two inequality measures: Gini index and Theil 
index. The table shows the contributed percentage of explanatory variables to total 
inequality. Decomposition results of Gini coefficient and Theil index are very similar. 
This shows that the method generates a robust result. Degrees of explanation remain 
at 50% to 60%, indicating that the results are quite reliable.  
The table shows that the contributions of all explanatory variables have obviously 
changed during the period from 1999 to 2007. This is because the PRC was 
experiencing the rapid transformation of economic structure. 
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Table 5：Factor Contributions to Inequality using the Shapley Method (%) 
 1999 2000 2001 
 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Debt ratio 2.14 0.67 3.98 1.07 1.69 0.41 
Export 0.53 –0.01 0.64 0.07 1.53 0.49 
Capital-labor ratio 17.56 20.14 15.14 20.12 13.24 21.73 
Per capita profit 3.03 2.83 4.88 7.56 4.98 10.79 
Overall labor productivity 4.48 6.45 0.97 2.12 5.16 11.93 
Monopoly 0.74 0.74 1.04 0.97 1.97 1.56 
Foreign-capital companies 17.11 8.05 15.71 6.79 14.07 4.98 
Region 9.69 4.11 10.06 4.05 9.28 0.96 
Scale 2.24 2.18 2.85 3.07 3.90 3.29 
Proportion of new products 0.71 0.22 1.30 0.35 1.04 0.30 
Total degrees of explanation  58.22 45.38 56.59 46.19 56.84 56.45 
 2002 2003 2004 
 Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Debt ratio 12.86 5.59 1.10 0.38 2.65 0.78 
Export 1.00 -0.29 1.31 0.46 2.70 0.89 
Capital-labor ratio 14.58 25.43 19.12 23.38 10.29 16.80 
Per capita profit 5.36 9.38 2.74 7.95 3.94 5.24 
Overall labor productivity 4.80 10.67 6.55 15.22 3.35 5.04 
Monopoly 1.88 1.76 1.86 1.01 2.22 2.37 
Foreign-capital companies 13.12 7.89 12.60 7.21 12.95 4.85 
Region 8.26 3.78 8.88 4.55 8.13 3.27 
Scale 3.54 3.32 2.62 2.06 4.92 5.30 
Proportion of new products 1.31 0.47 1.69 3.01 1.63 0.64 
Total degrees of explanation 66.71 67.99 58.48 65.23 52.78 45.18 
 2005 2006 2007 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Theil 
Index 
Debt ratio 2.08 0.61 2.57 0.46 2.16 0.57 
Export 2.20 0.33 1.89 0.26 1.72 0.36 
Capital-labor ratio 7.70 10.50 7.06 10.83 8.68 13.66 
Per capita profit 1.96 2.58 1.89 2.02 2.14 1.05 
Overall labor productivity 4.62 4.60 6.39 9.11 2.46 5.82 
Monopoly 2.17 1.66 2.59 1.20 2.45 1.30 
Foreign-capital companies 13.34 5.30 13.55 5.41 11.73 4.98 
Region 7.68 3.32 7.33 3.12 8.83 4.09 
Scale 5.38 4.04 6.56 4.14 7.23 4.99 
Proportion of new products 1.63 0.70 1.47 0.48 1.10 0.40 
Total degrees of explanation 48.76 33.62 51.30 37.04 48.51 37.22 
The impact of foreign-capital companies on the wage gap between domestic 
companies and foreign companies is quite significant over the period. Decomposition 
results of Gini coefficient show that the contribution of foreign-capital companies is from 
11% to 17%. The decomposition results of Theil index show that the contribution of 
foreign-capital companies is from 5% to 8%, which is the second-highest contribution to 
total inequality. In the long run, contribution for the foreign-capital companies shows a 
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declining trend. The Gini coefficient decomposition results show that it declines from 
17.11% in 1999 to 11.73% in 2007. Theil index decomposition results show that it 
declines from 8.05% to 4.98%. The most possible reason for this declining trend is that 
labor transfer and technological spillover effects together impact the wage gap between 
domestic companies and foreign companies. Another reason is that the management 
level of domestic enterprises has improved rapidly following the development of the 
PRC’s economy. The wage gap between domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises 
is gradually narrowing. 
The Capital-labor ratio has the highest level of contributions to total inequality; Gini 
coefficient decomposition results show that it is from 13% to 20%. Theil index 
decomposition results show that it is 8% to 17%. This means that the capital-labor ratio 
is still the most important factor in the wage determination process. On average, 
contribution of the region in third place – a variable reflecting the regional barrier for 
labor mobility – is also high in the PRC. The average scale of the enterprise has 
increased contributions totaling inequality. Gini coefficient decomposition results show 
it is from 2.24% in 1999 to 7.23% in 2007. Theil index decomposition results show that 
it is from 2.18% to 4.99%. This result indicates that economic scale has become the 
main determination factor for the wage gap. 
The contribution of monopoly to the wage gap is small. This result is different from that 
of previous research. Gini coefficient decomposition results show that it is from 1% to 
2.5%. Theil index decomposition results show that it is from 1% to 2%. The main 
reason is that data used in this paper come from Industrial Enterprises Database, 
where most observations are from the manufacture sector. However, most of the 
PRC’s monopoly companies concentrate in the non-manufacture sectors. 
Regarding the other variables, the contribution of export to the wage gap is not very 
high, implying that the wage bonus brought by the export tends to disappear in the 
PRC. The contribution of new products proportion remains at a low level. This is 
probably due to the reason that there are fewer innovative companies in the database 
or that innovation ability of industrial enterprises in the PRC is still at a low level. The 
difference in per capita profits plays the smaller role in the wage gap. This probably 
implies that enterprises always try to get higher profits by cutting wages. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Most developing countries have experienced a sharp increase of income inequality 
over the process of globalization. This study presents evidence that the inflow of FDI  
is closely associated with inter-enterprise wage inequality. Two mechanisms through 
which FDI impacts the wage gap between foreign firms and domestic firms in the host 
country are identified from existing literature: the labor transfer effect and technology 
spillover effect. We set up a model including these two mechanisms to analyze 
overall effects of FDI on the wage gap. According to theoretical results, we find that  
the inflow of FDI in the host country leads to the increase of wage inequality and then 
the decrease. Using Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, we investigate the 
contributions of the observed factors to the wage gap. The turning point of the wage 
gap caused by labor transfer effect took place in 2004. The technology spillover effect 
took place before 2004 in the PRC. The results of Shapley-value decomposition show 
that the contribution of FDI to wage gap shows a declining trend. Our findings about the 
technology spillover effect of FDI would help to narrow the wage gap between 
enterprises, suggesting that market-access barriers in the PRC should be eliminated in 
order to attract more companies with high technological levels.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Regression Results of Annual Cross-sectional Data 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Foreign-capital 
companies 
0.3144*** 0.2978*** 0.2915*** 0.2833*** 0.2677*** 
Debt ratio –0.1179*** –0.1942*** –0.0908*** –0.0507*** –0.0618*** 
Export –0.0714*** –0.0832*** –0.1206*** –0.1184*** –0.0997*** 
Capital-labor ratio 0.0429*** 0.0367*** 0.0282*** 0.0321*** 0.0431*** 
Per capita profit 0.1563*** 0.0171*** 0.1475*** 0.1611*** 0.0669*** 
Overall labor 
productivity 
0.5342*** 0.0888*** 0.4545*** 0.4183*** 0.4945*** 
Monopoly 0.1206*** 0.1530*** 0.2380*** 0.2357*** 0.2319*** 
Central region –0.3669*** –0.4001*** –0.4004*** –0.3800*** –0.3738*** 
Western Region –0.2242*** –0.2216*** –0.1965*** –0.2044*** –0.1802*** 
Scale 0.0342*** 0.0396*** 0.0492*** 0.0464*** 0.0295*** 
Proportion of new 
products 
0.0019*** 0.0030*** 0.0025*** 0.0034*** 0.0031*** 
Constant 2.1057*** 2.2771*** 2.2761*** 2.2932*** 2.3400*** 
R2 0.2718 0.2605 0.2477 0.2621 0.2643 
Adjusted R2 0.2712 0.2599 0.2471 0.2615 0.2637 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Foreign-capital 
companies 
0.2977*** 0.2902*** 0.3011*** 0.2649*** 
Debt ratio –0.1295*** –0.1029*** –0.1215*** –0.1119*** 
Export –0.1930*** –0.1593*** –0.1462*** –0.1431*** 
Capital-labor ratio 0.0193*** 0.0147*** 0.0121*** 0.0147*** 
Per capita profit 0.0114*** 0.0053*** 0.0028*** 0.0038*** 
Overall labor 
productivity 
0.2693*** 0.3444*** 0.2625*** 0.1364*** 
Monopoly 0.2421*** 0.2416*** 0.2854*** 0.1833*** 
Central region –0.3595*** –0.3173*** –0.3437*** –0.3825*** 
Western Region –0.1651*** –0.1720*** –0.1360*** –0.1799*** 
Scale 0.0468*** 0.0470*** 0.0531*** 0.0508*** 
Proportion of new 
products 
0.0033*** 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 0.0019*** 
Constant 2.5590*** 2.6247*** 2.7556*** 2.8926*** 
R2 0.2706 0.2417 0.2397 0.2274 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.241 0.2391 0.2268 
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